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Abstract
In this paper, we construct a universal type space for a class of possibility models
by imposing topological restrictions on the players’ beliefs. Along the lines of Mertens
and Zamir (1985) or Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), we show that the space of all
hierarchies of compact beliefs that satisfy common knowledge of coherency (types) is
canonically homeomorphic to the space of compact beliefs over the state of nature and
the types of the other players. The resulting type space is universal, in the sense that
any compact and continuous possibility structure can be uniquely represented within
it. We show how to extend our construction to conditional systems of compact beliefs.
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2AE London, UK.1. Introduction
In models of interactive beliefs, a state of the world should contain a speciﬁcation of the
state of nature, and a speciﬁcation of the players’ epistemic state, that is, their beliefs about
the state of nature and the other players’ beliefs. The speciﬁcation of the players’ beliefs can
lead to an inﬁnite regress or circularity problem: the beliefs of a player, say player a, are in
part deﬁned over the beliefs of the other players, which are in turn deﬁned over the beliefs
of player a, and so on. A key question raised by the inﬁnite regress problem is whether
it is possible to construct a complete model of a situation of incomplete information, in
which each state is an exhaustive description of the state of nature and of the other players’
epistemic states.
As argued by Aumann (1976), a model that is not common knowledge among the players
is necessarily incomplete, as an exhaustive description of a state should include the infor-
mational partitions and beliefs of all players in that state. Starting from the information
partitions or, alternatively, Kripke structures (Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi (1995, Chap-
ter 2)), to deﬁne hierarchies of beliefs presumes that the information partitions are common
knowledge in an “informal” sense. Of course, if the players’ types fully specify the players’
knowledge, one should be able to incorporate common knowledge of information partitions
into the players’ types. One is thus led to ask how, starting from a given incomplete infor-
mation situation, a commonly known model can be speciﬁed (see Dekel and Gul (1997) for
an overview of this issue).
In the context of Harsanyi’s (1967-1968) model of games with incomplete information,
Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) have solved this problem for
the case of probabilistic beliefs by showing the existence of a universal type space consisting
of all hierarchies of beliefs (types) for which coherency is common knowledge. In particu-
lar, a type of a player determines unambiguously a joint belief over the state of nature and
the other players’ types, and any such joint belief is represented by a type. The hierarchi-
cal construction of this canonical homeomorphism accomplishes the desired task: common
knowledge of coherency is the formal equivalent of the “informal” hypothesis that informa-
tion partitions are common knowledge. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) have extended this
result to the case of conditional beliefs, and Epstein and Wang (1996) to an important class
of non Bayesian beliefs.
1The inﬁnite regress problem persists in knowledge and possibility models where the be-
liefs of a player are represented by a possibility set consisting of all states regarded possible.
Instead of assuming the existence of a commonly known model, Fagin, Halpern and Vardi
(1991) attempt to construct such a model from primitive terms and syntactic operators.
However, it turns out that, in general, hierarchies of beliefs and their representation by
(commonly known) knowledge structures do not necessarily characterize fully the players’
knowledge. Indeed, even if an epistemic situation can be represented by a “local” (Kripke)
structure, it does not follows that such an epistemic situation is a complete representation
of the knowledge of the players. As pointed out by Dekel and Gul (1997), the problem is
that the same hierarchy of beliefs can in principle be associated with several beliefs over the
beliefs of the other players. An “informal” common knowledge assumption may then help to
uniquely determine the players’ beliefs. Speciﬁcally, Fagin, Halpern and Vardi (1991) have
shown that countable hierarchies of knowledge are not suﬃcient to describe adequately the
interactive knowledge of the players, and Fagin (1994) and Heifetz and Samet (1998) that
indeed no ordinal level in the hierarchy of knowledge suﬃces. Furthermore, Brandenburger
(1998) and Brandenburger and Keisler (1999) have shown that, except in degenerate cases,
any purely set-theoretic type model of beliefs is necessarily incomplete in that it is always
possible to construct a belief that is not held by any type. A positive result is shown in Fagin,
Geanakoplos, Halpern and Vardi (1999): if a countable description of the players’ interac-
tive beliefs satisﬁes a “continuity” condition, all higher levels of knowledge are determined
unambiguously.
A related concern with possibility models is the nonexistence of a universal space for the
agents’ beliefs. Heifetz and Samet (1998) have shown that, given at least two agents and two
states of nature, there is no universal knowledge space to which any knowledge space can
be mapped in a knowledge-preserving way. This result has been extended recently to every
class of Kripke structures that contains all knowledge spaces (Meier (2003)). Although not
every knowledge space is a possibility structure, and hence the results of Meier (2003) do
not apply directly, these results provide strong evidence that there is no universal possibility
structure for the class of all possibility structures.
These negative results suggest that a natural strategy to obtain a complete and universal
representation of players’ interactive knowledge in possibility models is to impose further
restrictions on beliefs. The objective of the present paper is to provide such a construction
2for a class of possibility models by assuming that players’ beliefs satisfy some topological re-
quirements. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the basic uncertainty space is a compact Hausdorﬀ
space and we construct hierarchies of compact possibility sets. Endowing spaces of compact
subsets with the standard Hausdorﬀ topology ensures that this procedure can be repeated
from any stage of the hierarchy to the next. We show that the space of all hierarchies of com-
pact beliefs satisfying common knowledge of coherency (types) is canonically homeomorphic
to the space of compact beliefs over the state of nature and the types of the other players,
and is universal for the class of compact and continuous possibility structures. A natural
concern raised by any construction that imposes restrictions on player’s beliefs is how limita-
tive these restrictions are. In that respect, the topological assumptions made in the present
paper are not overly restrictive. Indeed, ﬁnite possibility structures are commonly used in
applications, and every such structure, appropriately endowed with the discrete topology,
yields a compact and continuous possibility structure.
Our construction enables to establish which hierarchies of beliefs are complete descrip-
tions of the knowledge of the players. The existence of a universal space delivers completeness
in two senses. First, common knowledge of coherency ensures that a hierarchy of beliefs of
a player is just a belief about the state of nature and the hierarchies of beliefs of the other
players. In particular, every type of a player exactly pins down a partitional model, as in
the probabilistic setups of Mertens and Zamir (1985) or Brandenburger and Deckel (1993).
Second, common knowledge of coherency also ensures that the possibility correspondence
is onto: any belief about the state of nature and the hierarchies of the other players corre-
sponds to a hierarchy of beliefs, so that there is no loss of generality in representing player’s
types by hierarchies. Of course, other representations are possible. But the universality of
the resulting type space implies that any compact and continuous possibility structure can
be uniquely represented within it, and thus can essentially be viewed as a subspace of it.
Thus the universal type space is (internally) complete but also (externally) without loss of
generality.
An important motivation for introducing hierarchical models of beliefs is to provide epis-
temic conditions for solution concepts in games (Tan and Werlang (1988)). For normal-form
games, our construction can be used to provide an axiomatization of Bernheim’s (1984) con-
cept of point-rationalizability (Mariotti (2003)). The recent debate on backward induction
has also prompted the development of epistemic models for extensive-form games. Battigalli
3and Siniscalchi (1999) provide a complete model of conditional probability systems for the
epistemic analysis of games. As pointed out by Brandenburger and Keisler (1999), however,
epistemic conditions for solution concepts in games of perfect information should carry over
to non probabilistic frameworks. In the last part of the paper, we extend our analysis to con-
ditional systems of compact beliefs by adjusting the construction of Battigalli and Siniscalchi
(1999) to our framework.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in Section 2, and the universal
type space is constructed in Section 3. The main assumptions and results are discussed in




Deﬁnition. Consider two individuals1, a and b, facing uncertainty over a space S. The
concept of a possibility structure delivers the simplest model of interactive beliefs over S.
Speciﬁcally, for any set X, let P(X) denote the set of non-empty subsets of X. The following
deﬁnition is borrowed from Brandenburger and Keisler (1999):
Deﬁnition 1 An S–based possibility structure is a pair (T;R) consisting of:
(i) A non-empty set T;
(ii) A mapping R : T ! P(S £ T).
Elements of T are called types. R is a possibility mapping that assigns to each type t 2 T
of a player a set-theoretic belief R(t) ½ S £ T about the basic uncertainty parameter and
the type of the other player. For any t 2 T, R(t) represents the pairs in S £ T considered
possible by type t, and is called the possibility set of type t.
An incompleteness result. Possibility models highlight a conceptual diﬃculty for the notion
of interactive beliefs. Suppose, for example, that T represents all possible beliefs of the
players. Then, any subset of S £ T should be, in principle, a possible belief. The following
result shows that this is impossible.
1This is without loss of generality. Our results easily extend to an arbitrary number of agents.
4Lemma 1 Let (T;R) be an S–based possibility structure. If R is onto, then S and T are
singletons.
The intuition is simple. If S contains at least two elements, then so must T. But then, a
simple adaptation of Cantor’s theorem implies that P(T), and thus P(S £ T), must have
a strictly larger cardinality than T. This result shows that, in contrast with probabilistic
models, there does not exist a complete possibility structure: one can always ﬁnd a belief
over S and the beliefs of the opponent that is not represented within the model. (See
Brandenburger (1998) for a similar result.)
Remark 1 Lemma 1 relies on a cardinality argument. Brandenburger and Keisler (1999)
prove a stronger result: if S is not a singleton then, for any S–based possibility structure
(T;R), it is possible to deﬁne a subset of S £ T that is not a possibility set using only the
resources of the ﬁrst-order language induced by (T;R).
To derive a universal type space, it is necessary to impose structural conditions on S and T,
and impose restrictions on the possibility mapping R. This is the objective of the next two
subsections.
2.2. Technical preliminaries
Given a topological space X, let K(X) denote the set of non-empty compact subsets of X.
We endow K(X) with the Hausdorﬀ topology. This is the topology generated by all subsets
of the form fK 2 K(X) j K ½ Ug and fK 2 K(X) j K \ U 6= ;g for U open in X. For the
remainder of this paper, K(X) will always be endowed with the Hausdorﬀ topology. The
following lemma is standard; a proof is available in Appendix A.
Lemma 2 Let X, Y be topological spaces, and f : X ! Y a continuous map. Then,
(i) If X is Hausdorﬀ, K(X) is Hausdorﬀ;
(ii) If X is compact, K(X) is compact;
(iii) The mapping fK : K(X) ! K(Y ) : K 7! f(K) is continuous;
(iv) If Z is a topological space and g : Y ! Z a continuous map, then (g ± f)K = gK ± fK.
5For future reference, deﬁne the space O(X) of open subsets of X distinct from X itself.
Its Hausdorﬀ topology is generated by all subsets of the form fO 2 O(X) j F ½ Og and
fO 2 O(X) j O [ F 6= Xg for F closed in X. By taking complement sets, it is immediate
that if X is compact and Hausdorﬀ, O(X) is homeomorphic to K(X).
2.3. A topological model of beliefs
Compact possibility structures. The restrictions that we shall impose on S, T and R are
topological. The following assumption will be maintained throughout the paper.
Assumption 1 S is a compact Hausdorﬀ space.
The basic drawback of the pure set-theoretic model of Subsection 2.1 is that players can
distinguish too ﬁnely between diﬀerent subsets of S £ T. An intuitive restriction is that
players cannot distinguish very “close” subsets. Speciﬁcally, given a topology on S £ T, we
shall assume that players cannot tell apart two subsets of S £T with the same closure. This
leads to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2 An S–based compact possibility structure is a pair (T;R) consisting of:
(i) A non-empty Hausdorﬀ space T;
(ii) A mapping R : T ! K(S £ T).
As in Deﬁnition 1, a player’s type speciﬁes a set-theoretic belief about the basic uncertainty
parameter and the type of the other player. The diﬀerence is that we restrict the possibility
sets of each player to be compact subsets of S£T. If T is a compact Hausdorﬀ space, this is
equivalent to considering the quotient space P(S£T)= » where any two sets X;Y 2 P(S£T)
are »–equivalent if and only if they have the same closure. This follows from the fact that
compact and closed subsets of a compact Hausdorﬀ space coincide.
An S–based compact possibility structure (T;R) is complete if the possibility mapping
R is onto, and is continuous if R is continuous. The set of S–based compact continuous
possibility structures is denoted by C.
Deﬁne IdS to be the identity map on S and consider a family F of S–based compact
possibility structures. An S–based compact possibility structure (T F;RF) is universal for

















¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡! K(S £ T F)
:
In the terminology of Mertens and Zamir (1985) or Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999), (T F;RF)
is universal if there is a unique belief morphism ' from (T;R) to (T F;RF).
3. The universal possibility structure
In this section, we show the existence of a universal possibility structure for C. We ﬁrst
construct a canonical homeomorphism between hierarchies of beliefs that satisfy common
knowledge of coherency and beliefs over S and such hierarchies. The line of argument
is similar to that in Brandenburger and Dekel (1993). We then show that this space of
hierarchies of beliefs together with the canonical homeomorphism form a universal compact
continuous possibility structure.
3.1. The canonical homeomorphism
We restrict players’ beliefs at any stage of the hierarchy to be compact. A player ﬁrst-order
belief over S will be represented by an element of K(S). A player’s second-order belief will be
represented by an element of K(S£K(S)), a joint belief over S and his opponent’s ﬁrst-order
belief. In general, deﬁne inductively the sets
X0 = S; Xn+1 = Xn £ K(Xn); n ¸ 0:
A player’s type is a hierarchy of beliefs f·ngn¸1 2
Q
n¸0 K(Xn). We denote by T0 the set of
all possible types.
As in Bayesian models, a natural coherency condition on a player’s type is that diﬀerent
levels of beliefs do not contradict each other. For any sets X and Y , let us denote by ProjX
be the projection of elements in X£Y on X. The following deﬁnition provides the coherency
condition.
7Deﬁnition 3 A type f·ngn¸1 2 T0 is coherent if and only if
·n = ProjXn¡1(·n+1); n ¸ 1:
The next lemma, a topological version of Kolmogorov’s extension theorem, states that a
compact subset of a countable product of compact Hausdorﬀ spaces is determined by its
projections on the cylinder sets.
Lemma 3 Let fZngn¸0 be a collection of compact Hausdorﬀ spaces. For each n ¸ 0, let
Zn =
Q





f·ngn¸1 j ·n 2 K(Z
n¡1) and ProjZn¡1(·n+1) = ·n
ª
:
There exists a homeomorphism f : D ! K(Z1) such that, for any f·ngn¸1 2 D,
ProjZm¡1 (f(f·ngn¸1)) = ·m; m ¸ 1:
Let T1 be the set of coherent types. The following proposition is an immediate consequence
of Lemma 3. It states that a coherent type for a player is equivalent to a belief over S and
the type of the other player.
Proposition 1 There exists a homeomorphism f : T1 ! K(S £ T0) such that, for any
f·ngn¸1 2 T1,
ProjXm¡1 (f(f·ngn¸1)) = ·m; m ¸ 1:
It should be noted that the homeomorphism f is canonical in that it preserves the marginal
beliefs associated to any level of the hierarchy by any coherent type. As is customary in
this literature, we close the model by imposing common knowledge of coherency. Deﬁne
inductively the sets
Tk+1 = ft 2 T1 j f(t) ½ S £ Tkg; k ¸ 1;
and let T1 =
T
k¸1 Tk. T1 £ T1 is interpreted as the set of players’ types such that each
player believes that the other player’s type is coherent, believes that the other player believes
that his type is coherent, and so on. Hereafter, we shall refer to T1 as the universal type
space. We can now state our main result.
Proposition 2 T1 is non-empty. Moreover, the restriction of f to T1 induces a homeo-
morphism g : T1 ! K(S £ T1):
8It should be noted that the non-emptiness of T1 depends crucially on the compactness of the
sets fTkgk¸1. As the homeomorphism f, g preserves the beliefs associated by a player’s type
to any level of the hierarchy. The reader familiar with the results in Fagin, Geanakoplos,
Halpern and Vardi (1999) mentioned in the Introduction will surely notice that restricting
the beliefs to belong to K(S £ T1) ensures that appropriate “continuity” conditions are
satisﬁed.
3.2. Universality
In possibility structures, continuity is not only a desirable property but also a crucial one,
as we shall argue, for the representation of hierarchical knowledge.
Preliminaries. To investigate the relationship between hierarchical beliefs and compact pos-
sibility models, it is convenient to construct a second hierarchy of beliefs, hereafter called
¤–beliefs. The starting point of this hierarchy is the same as in Subsection 3.1, i.e., a belief
over S represented by an element of K(S). However, for any n ¸ 2, a player’s nth order




0 = S; X
¤
n+1 = S £ K(X
¤
n); n ¸ 0:




n). We denote by T ¤
0 the set of all possible
¤–hierarchies. As for hierarchies of beliefs, a coherency condition is imposed in order to
ensure that the diﬀerent levels of ¤–beliefs do not contradict each other. Deﬁne the family





S; Pn+1 = (IdS;Pn)
K; n ¸ 1:
Since ProjS is continuous, Lemma 2(iii) guarantees that the operator Pn is well deﬁned
and continuous for any n ¸ 1. The following deﬁnition states a coherency condition for
¤–hierarchies analogous to that given for hierarchies in Deﬁnition 3.
Deﬁnition 4 A ¤–hierarchy f·¤
ngn¸1 2 T ¤





n+1); n ¸ 1:
A player’s coherent ¤–hierarchy generates the same beliefs over S at all levels, and coherent
hierarchical ¤–beliefs about the other player’s lower order ¤–beliefs. Let T ¤
1 be the set of
coherent ¤–hierarchies.
9We shall later show formally that T ¤
1 is homeomorphic to T1. To see this intuitively,
consider, for instance, the space:
X3 = S £ K(S) £ K(S £ K(S)) £ K(S £ K(S) £ K(S £ K(S)))
used to model fourth-order beliefs in the construction of the original hierarchies. If a player,
say a, believes that the beliefs of the opponent b are coherent, the second and third elements,
K(S) and K(S £ K(S)), of the Cartesian product that deﬁnes X3 are redundant since they
can be derived by projection of K(S£K(S)£K(S£K(S))). By the same token, if a believes
that b believes that a’s beliefs are coherent, K(S) inside K(S £K(S)£K(S £K(S))) is also
redundant. Deleting these redundant spaces, one obtains X¤
3.
A representation result. We now return to the problem of representation of hierarchies by
types. Consider a compact possibility structure (T;R) and deﬁne inductively the sets
ˆ X0 = S £ T; ˆ Xn+1 = S £ K( ˆ Xn); n ¸ 0:
We then have the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Suppose that (T;R) is in C. Then, the inductive family of functions
R0 = R; Rn+1 = (IdS;Rn)
K; n ¸ 0
is well deﬁned and, for each n ¸ 0, the mapping Rn : K( ˆ Xn¡1) ! K( ˆ Xn) is continuous.
The continuity of R guarantees that compactness is preserved in the iteration. The mappings
fRngn¸0 operate on their respective domains by “expanding” a type into the set of hierarchies
consistent with it. Speciﬁcally, if R is continuous, one can associate to any type t 2 T a
sequence fˆ ·ngn¸1 2
Q
n¸0 K( ˆ Xn) by setting ˆ ·n = Rn¡1 ± ::: ± R0(t) for any n ¸ 1.
Any sequence fˆ ·ngn¸1 2
Q
n¸0 K( ˆ Xn) can be transformed into a ¤–hierarchy. First,




S; Qn+1 = (IdS;Qn)
K; n ¸ 0:
Again, since ProjS is continuous, Lemma 2(iii) guarantees that Qn is well deﬁned and con-
tinuous for any n ¸ 0. The following lemma clariﬁes the relationships between the families
of operators fPngn¸1, fQngn¸0 and fRngn¸0.
10Lemma 5 Suppose that (T;R) is in C. Then, the following diagram commutes:
T
R0
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡! K( ˆ X0)
R1
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡! K( ˆ X1)
R2
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡! K( ˆ X2)
R3



















Ã¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ K(X¤
1)
P2
Ã¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ K(X¤
2)
P3
Ã¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¢¢¢
The proof is by induction, and to be found in the Appendix. Composing the operators Qn
and Rn for any n ¸ 0, one can map a type to a ¤–hierarchy.
Deﬁnition 5 Consider (T;R) in C. A type t 2 T generates a ¤–hierarchy f·¤




n = Qn¡1 ± Rn¡1 ± ::: ± R0(t); n ¸ 1:
Now denote by 'T;R the mapping T ! T ¤
0 : t 7! fQn¡1 ± Rn¡1 ± ::: ± R0(t)gn¸1.
Proposition 3 Suppose that (T;R) is in C. Then,
(i) 'T;R is continuous and maps T into T ¤
1;
(ii) 'T1;g : T1 ! T ¤
1 is a homeomorphism.
Proposition 3 shows that continuity of the possibility mapping in a compact possibility
structure (T;R) allows to map any type in T to a coherent ¤–hierarchy, or, equivalently by
(ii), to an inﬁnite hierarchy in T1. This transformation is possible in general only if R is
continuous (See Mertens and Zamir (1985) or Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) for similar
results in the Bayesian setting).
The homeomorphisms g : T1 ! K(S £ T1) and 'T1;g : T1 ! T ¤
1 induce a homeomor-
phism g¤ = (IdS;'T1;g)K±g±'
¡1
T1;g between T ¤
1 and K(S £T ¤
1). Using the canonicity of g, it
follows that g¤ is also canonical in the sense that, for any coherent ¤–hierarchy f·¤










m+1; m ¸ 1:
That is, g¤ preserves the marginal beliefs associated to any level of the hierarchy by any
coherent ¤–hierarchy. Naturally, 'T¤
1 ;g¤ = IdT¤
1, since any coherent ¤–hierarchy coincides
with its own representation. It should be noted that '
¡1
T1;g : T ¤
1 ! T1 is the mapping that
associates to any coherent ¤–hierarchy the universal type that generates it.
11Take (T;R) 2 C. It is easy to verify that the following diagram commutes:
T
'T;R













¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡! K(S £ T ¤
1)
:
Hence 'T;R is a belief morphism from (T;R) to (T ¤
1;g¤). To prove that (T ¤
1;g¤), and therefore
(T1;g) by homeomorphism, is universal for C, we need only to check that 'T;R is the unique
belief morphism from (T;R) to (T ¤
1;g¤). We only sketch the argument. Given a compact,
continuous possibility structure (T;R), construct the mappings fRngn¸0, fQngn¸0 as above.
The same procedure applied to (T ¤
1;g¤) instead of (T;R) yields the analogous mappings
fR¤
ngn¸0, and fQ¤
ngn¸0. If Á : T ! T ¤
1 is a belief morphism from (T;R) to (T ¤
1;g¤), then it





































K(S £ K(S £ T))
(IdS;(IdS;Á)K)K














. . . ¢¢¢
. . .
:
³ ³ ³ ³ )
³ ³ ³ ³ )
We leave it to the reader to verify that the commutativity of this diagram and the fact that
'T¤
1 ;g¤ = IdT¤
1 imply that Á = 'T;R.
4. Discussion of the results
We shall now discuss the results proved in the previous section.
124.1. On the compactness assumption
It is not a priori clear why one should restrict the possibility sets to be compact. Indeed,
since K(X) is homeomorphic to O(X) for any compact Hausdorﬀ space X, our construction
implies the existence of a type space ˜ T1 and of a homeomorphism ˜ g : ˜ T1 ! O(S £ ˜ T1).
This seems to indicate that one could choose the open sets as well as the closed sets as a
basis for the construction of a complete interactive model. Intuitively, this would correspond
to a situation in which players cannot distinguish diﬀerent subsets of the type space with the
same interior.2 The problem is that, contrary to the space of compact subsets, removing the
empty set from the space of open sets undermines the compactness of the resulting space.3
A type space based on the open sets would then have to include the empty set as a possible
belief. Intuitively, O(S £ ˜ T1) should instead be interpreted as the set of subsets regarded as
impossible by a player, and the resulting impossibility structure (˜ T1; ˜ g) as the mirror image
of (T1;g). Of course, one could eliminate the empty set from O(S £ ˜ T1) after constructing
the type space ˜ T1. This procedure, however, would not prevent the empty set from being
“possible” for lower order beliefs. Moreover, the resulting model would not exhibit common
knowledge of “impossibility” of “possible” empty sets. The arguments used above to obtain
common knowledge of coherency are of little use since, as we have shown, removing the
empty set from O(S £ ˜ T1) does not preserve compactness.
4.2. Continuity and the Bayesian model
Complete possibility structures can also be derived from the universal Bayesian type space
constructed by Mertens and Zamir (1985) or Brandenburger and Dekel (1993). Speciﬁ-
cally, let S be a compact metric space. Brandenburger and Dekel show that there exists a
non-empty compact metric space Θ1 (the “universal Bayesian type space”) and a home-
omorphism ° from Θ1 to ∆(S £ Θ1), the set of Borel probability measures on S £ Θ1
endowed with the weak¤ topology. Denote by Supp : ∆(S £Θ1) ! K(S £Θ1) the support
mapping. It is easy to check that it is onto. Since ° is a homeomorphism, it follows that
the mapping Supp ± ° : Θ1 ! K(S £ Θ1) is onto, and therefore that (Θ1;Supp ± °) is an
2The fact that the trivial belief S £ ˜ T1 does not belong to O(S £ ˜ T1) might seem disturbing at ﬁrst.
However, for any compact Hausdorﬀ space X, K(X) [ f;g is compact and homeomorphic to O(X) [ fXg.
Hence, adding ; to K(X) allows to extend the homeomorphism ˜ g to include the trivial belief.
3Formally, when X is an inﬁnite compact Hausdorﬀ space, O(X) n f;g is not compact even if O(X) is.
To see why, note that the collection fO 2 O(X) j fxg ½ Ogx2X is an open cover for O(X)nf;g which, since
X is Hausdorﬀ, does not have a ﬁnite subcover.
13S–based complete compact possibility structure.
However, the support mapping is not continuous and hence, the possibility mapping
Supp ± ° is not continuous either. Indeed, two probabilistic types µ1, µ2 2 Θ1 can be
arbitrarily close to each other and thus induce arbitrarily close beliefs °(µ1) and °(µ2) (in
the sense of the weak¤ topology on ∆(S£Θ1)), whereas the probability measures °(µ1) and
°(µ2) have very diﬀerent supports (in the sense of the Hausdorﬀ topology on K(S £ Θ1)).
More importantly, the construction of the previous section does not apply: one cannot in
general translate a Bayesian type µ 2 Θ1 into an explicit hierarchy of compact beliefs. The
reason is that even if the possibility mapping Supp±° maps each type µ 2 Θ1 to a compact
subset of S £ Θ1, the map (IdS;Supp ± °) does not necessarily map a compact subset of
S £ Θ1 to a compact subset of S £ K(S £ Θ1).
Example 1 Suppose S = [0;1], µ 2 Θ1, and fsngn¸1 a sequence in (0;1] converging to 0.
For any n ¸ 1, deﬁne µn = °¡1(1=n ±(sn;µ) + (1 ¡ 1=n)±(1;µ)) and µ1 = °¡1(±(1;µ)), where for
any x 2 S £ Θ1, ±x is the point mass at x. Clearly, fµngn¸1 converges weakly to µ1, so
fµn j 1 · n · 1g 2 K(Θ1). Hence, since Supp ± ° is onto, there exists # 2 Θ1 such that
R0(#) ´ Supp ± °(˜ µ) = f(0;µn) j 1 · n · 1g. But
(IdS;R0) ± R0(#) = f(0;f(sn;µ) j n ¸ 1g)g [ f(0;f(1;µ)g)g
is not a compact subset of S £ K(S £ Θ1) as fsngn¸1 converges to 0, not 1. In particular,
its projection on S £ K(S), f(0;fsn j n ¸ 1g)g [ f(0;f1g)g, does not belong to K(X¤
1).
Example 1 can be easily generalized to any compact Hausdorﬀ space S with at least one
accumulation point, and to any discontinuous mapping S ! K(S £Θ1), but not to a ﬁnite
set S, for instance. However, it should be noted that, even if S is ﬁnite, in which case any
µ 2 Θ1 induces a hierarchy in T ¤
1, closeness of two types in the summary structure Θ1 does
not imply closeness of the induced hierarchies in T ¤
1.
One may also argue that this lack of continuity is an artifact of using the support mapping
in the above construction, and that a diﬀerent mapping could associate compact subsets of
S £ Θ1 to elements of Θ1 continuously. However, the following example shows that, in
general, such mapping does not exist.
Example 2 Suppose that S is not connected, and let (T;R) be an S–based complete com-
pact possibility structure such that R is continuous. Since S is not connected, it can be
14partitioned into two disjoint open sets S1 and S2. This yields a partition of K(S £ T) into
two disjoint open sets fK 2 K(S£T) j K ½ S1£Tg and fK 2 K(S£T) j K \S2£T 6= ;g.
Therefore, K(S£T) is not connected. Since R is onto and continuous, it follows that T is not
connected. On the other hand, ∆(S £ Θ1) and hence Θ1 by homeomorphism are arcwise
connected, hence connected. Thus if (Θ1;R) is an S–based complete compact possibility
structure, R cannot be continuous.
It follows from our previous observations that if S is disconnected and has an accumulation
point, and if (Θ1;R) is an S–based complete compact possibility structure, there always
exists a type µ 2 Θ1 that has no explicit representation in T ¤
1. Hence, the probabilistic
(support) model cannot be embedded in a model of compact set-theoretic beliefs.
4.3. Comparison with Epstein and Wang (1996)
The existence of a space T homeomorphic to K(S £ T) can be directly derived from the
embedding result in Theorem 6.1 of Epstein and Wang (1996). Our objective, however,
is not restricted to showing the existence of such a homeomorphism. Rather, our main
focus is to show that any compact and continuous possibility structure can be uniquely and
canonically represented in T1. We also wish to remark that, in general, a type space T in
a compact continuous possibility structure (T;R) where R is a homeomorphism between T
and K(S £ T) is not necessarily homeomorphic to the universal type space T1. To see this,
deﬁne inductively the sets
Y0 = [0;1]; Yn+1 = K(Yn); n ¸ 0:
Consider the mapping p0 : Y1 ! Y0 : y1 7! inffy0 j y0 2 y1g. Using the usual metric for
the Hausdorﬀ topology on K([0;1]), it is easy to verify that p0 is onto and continuous. For
any n ¸ 1, deﬁne the mapping pn : Yn+1 ! Yn : yn+1 7! fpn¡1(yn) j yn 2 yn+1g. Together
with Lemma 2(iii), the fact that p0 is onto and continuous implies by induction that all the
mappings fpngn¸0 are also onto and continuous and that pn+1 = pK
n for any n ¸ 0. Deﬁne
Y1 = ffyngn¸0 j yn 2 Yn and yn = pn(yn+1); n ¸ 0g:
Following the same lines as in the proof of Lemma 3, it is easy to check that Y1 is a
non-empty compact subset of
Q
n¸0 Yn endowed with the product topology. Moreover:
Lemma 6 There exists a homeomorphism p : Y1 ! K(Y1).
15We are now ready to complete our example. Suppose that S is a singleton. Then p induces
a homeomorphism from Y1 to K(S £ Y1). However, T1 is then a singleton, whereas Y1 is
not. Hence Y1 and T1 cannot be homeomorphic.4
5. Inﬁnite hierarchies of conditional compact beliefs
In this section, we show how the inﬁnite hierarchies of Section 3 can be generalized to
compact conditional belief systems by adapting the construction provided by Battigalli and
Siniscalchi (1999) for probabilistic beliefs.
5.1. Conditional belief systems
Consider an agent facing uncertainty over the space S. As in Section 2, a belief of the
agent is a possibility set, that is, an element of P(S). In addition, let B ½ P(S) be a non-
empty collection representing the events that are observable by the agent. A conditional
belief system assigns to any observable event B 2 B a belief about the basic uncertainty
parameter, representing the states in S considered possible by the agent conditional on B.
The following deﬁnition is adapted from Brandenburger (1997):
Deﬁnition 6 A conditional belief system on (S;B) is a mapping » : B ! P(S) such that:
(i) For all B 2 B, »(B) ½ B;
(ii) For all A;B 2 B, if A ½ B and »(B) \ A 6= ;, then »(A) = »(B) \ A.
Condition (i) means that an observable event is self-evident whenever it occurs. Condition
(ii) can be interpreted as a set-theoretic version of Bayes’ rule. It captures the idea that
the agent maintains his beliefs as long as they are not contradicted by further evidence. It
implies in particular that if A and B are two observable events such that A reﬁnes B and the
agent believes that A obtains conditional on B, then he must have the same beliefs at A and
B. It should be noted that a conditional belief system need not be monotonic. For instance,
if A ½ B and »(B)\A = ;, that is, the agent thinks that A is impossible conditional on B,
then necessarily »(A) \ »(B) = ;.
4See Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994, Chapter III, Theorem 1.2, Remark 2) for a related point in the
Bayesian setup.
165.2. Topological restrictions
To construct a universal space of conditional belief systems, we need to impose conditions
on S and B, as well as on conditional belief systems. We maintain that S is a compact
Hausdorﬀ space. In addition, we shall impose the following condition on B. (Recall that a
subset of a topological space is clopen if it is both closed and open.)
Assumption 2 B is a collection of non-empty clopen subsets of S such that S 2 B.
As in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999), Assumption 2 is crucial for our results. Together with
Assumption 1, it implies that every event B 2 B is compact as well as its complementary.
Although this might seem a very strong assumption, it holds in a variety of situations. The
less interesting case is when B = fSg, that is, the only observable event is the state space
itself. More interestingly, Assumption 2 is also satisﬁed when S is a product space S0 £ T,
where S0 is a ﬁnite set, and B is composed of events of the form B0 £ T, where B0 is any
non-empty subset of S0. It should be noted that, since separability plays no role in our
analysis, there is no need to restrict the family B to be at most countable, as Battigalli and
Sinischalchi (1999) do. For instance, one can take S to be the product of an uncountable
number of copies of a ﬁnite set endowed with the discrete topology, and let B be the family
of non-empty ﬁnite cylinders, which is uncountable.
Deﬁnition 7 A conditional belief system » on (S;B) is compact if for any B 2 B, »(B) 2
K(S).
We shall denote by K(S;B) the set of compact conditional belief systems on (S;B). Note that
K(S;B) can be seen as a subset of the product space K(S)B, which is a compact Hausdorﬀ
space when endowed with the product topology. We then have the following lemma.
Lemma 7 K(S;B) 2 K(K(S)B).
This result provides us with the recursivity necessary to any hierarchical construction. In-
deed, since K(S;B) is itself compact and Hausdorﬀ, so is S £ K(S;B). We can then endow
this latter set with the family of compact events inherited from B, that is, the family C(B)
of cylinders C(B) = B £ K(S;B), B 2 B. These cylinders form a family of clopen events in
S £ K(S;B). Hence the space of conditional systems of compact beliefs over S £ K(S;B),
K(S £ K(S;B);C(B)) is a compact subset of K(S £ K(S;B))C(B), and the construction can
be iterated again.
17Deﬁnition 8 An (S;B)–based compact conditional possibility structure is a pair (T;R)
consisting of:
(i) A non-empty Hausdorﬀ space T;
(ii) A mapping R : T ! K(S £ T;Bc), where Bc = fB £ T j B 2 Bg.
As before, the elements of T are called types. R is a conditional possibility mapping that
assigns to each type t 2 T of a player a conditional belief system R(t) about the basic
uncertainty parameter and the type of the other player. An (S;B)–based compact conditional
possibility structure (T;R) is complete if the possibility mapping R is onto, and is continuous
if R is continuous. Consider a family F of (S;B)–based compact conditional possibility
structures. An (S;B)–based compact conditional possibility structure (T F;RF) is universal


















¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡! K(S £ T F)
;
where RB and RF
B denote respectively the B-components of R and RF.
5.3. The inﬁnite hierarchy
We are now ready to construct the universal space of compact conditional belief systems
over (S;B). For notational simplicity, we assume that there are only two agents, a and b,
facing the same basic uncertainty space S, and sharing the same collection B of observable
events. These agents have beliefs about S and about each other’s beliefs conditional on each
observable event B 2 B. Let X0 = S, B0 = B, and construct inductively the sets
Xn+1 = Xn £ K(Xn;Bn);
Bn+1 = fC ½ Xn+1 j 9B 2 Bn : C = B £ K(Xn;Bn)g; n ¸ 0:
A player’s (n+1)th-order conditional system of compact belief is an element »n+1 of K(Xn;Bn).
A nth-order conditioning event is an element of Bn, that is, given some B 2 B, a cylinder
18set of the form




For each B 2 B, any »n+1 2 K(Xn;Bn) determines a compact belief »n+1(Cn(B)) on Xn
conditional on B. Since Bn is essentially a copy of B in Xn, we can without risk of confusion
write K(Xn;B) instead of K(Xn;Bn). A player’s type is a hierarchy of beliefs f»ngn¸1 2
Q
n¸0 K(Xn;B). We denote by T0(B) the set of all possible types. By Lemma 7, it is clear
that T0(B) is compact and Hausdorﬀ in the product topology. It follows also that K(S£T0;B)
is compact Hausdorﬀ as well. For any B 2 B, we set C1(B) = B £ T0(B).
5.4. The universal possibility structure
The coherency condition in Deﬁnition 3 easily extends to compact conditional beliefs systems.
Deﬁnition 9 A type f»ngn¸1 2 T0(B) is coherent if and only if, for any B 2 B,
»n(Cn¡1(B)) = ProjXn¡1(»n+1(Cn(B))); n ¸ 1:
Let T1(B) be the set of coherent types. The following proposition states that a coherent type
for a player is equivalent to a system of conditional compact beliefs over S and the type of
the other player.
Proposition 4 There exists a homeomorphism f(B) : T1(B) ! K(S £ T0(B);B) such that,
for any f»ngn¸1 2 T1(B) and B 2 B,
ProjXm¡1(f(B)(f»ngn¸1)(C1(B))) = »m(Cm¡1(B)); m ¸ 1:
Finally, we close the model by imposing common knowledge of coherency. This is done in a
manner similar to the unconditional model. Deﬁne inductively the sets:
Tk+1(B) = ft 2 T1(B) j f(B)(t)(C1(B)) ½ B £ Tk(B); B 2 Bg; k ¸ 1;
and let T1(B) =
T
k¸1 Tk(B).5 The following result parallels Proposition 2.
Proposition 5 T1(B) is non-empty. Moreover, the restriction of f(B) to T1(B) induces a
homeomorphism g(B) : T1(B) ! K(S £ T1(B);B):
5As noted by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) in their construction of hierarchies of conditional proba-
bilistic beliefs, there cannot be any inconsistency in assuming that there is common knowledge of coherency
conditional on any event B 2 B, since these “external” events are deﬁned on the basic uncertainty space S,
and therefore do not convey any restriction about the epistemic types of the players.
19Finally, (T1(B);g(B)) can be shown to be an universal compact continuous conditional
possibility structure by arguments analogous to those in Section 3.
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20Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. It is immediate that if S and T are singletons, the mapping R
is onto. Conversely, suppose there exists an onto mapping R : T ! P(S £ T). Then,
for any s 2 S, there exists an onto mapping Rs : T ! fsg £ P(T). Then the mapping
f : T ! P(T) : t 7! ProjP(T)(t) is onto. Let A = ft 2 T j t 62 f(t)g. If A 6= ;, the usual
diagonalization argument applies. Hence A = ;, and f¡1(fftgg) = ftg for any t 2 T. If T
is not a singleton, there does not exists a t 2 T such that f(t) = T, a contradiction. (This
argument follows Brandenburger (1998), Lemma 4.4.) Thus T is a singleton, hence R is
one-to-one, and therefore a bijection. It follows that S is a singleton as well. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) Let K1;K2 2 K(X), K1 6= K2, and, without loss of generality, take
x1 2 K1nK2. Since X is Hausdorﬀ, there exist two disjoint open subsets of X, U and V , such
that x1 2 U and K2 ½ V . Let U = fK 2 K(X) j K\U 6= ;g and V = fK 2 K(X) j K ½ V g.
Then U and V are open subsets of K(X) such that K1 2 U, K2 2 V, and U \ V = ;. Hence
K(X) is Hausdorﬀ.
(ii) SK(X) = ffK 2 K(X) j K ½ Ug; fK 2 K(X) j K \ U 6= ;g; U open in Xg
forms a subbase of the Hausdorﬀ topology on K(X). By Alexander’s subbase theorem,
K(X) is compact if and only if every SK(X)–cover of K(X) has a ﬁnite subcover. Let
C = ffK 2 K(X) j K ½ Uig; fK 2 K(X) j K \ Vj 6= ;ggi2I;j2J be an SK(X)–cover of
K(X) associated to collections fUigi2I and fVjgj2J of open subsets of X. Suppose ﬁrst that
X =
S
j2J Vj. Then since X is compact, one can extract a ﬁnite subcover fVjgj2J0 of X
from fVjgj2J, and C0 = ffK 2 K(X) j K \ Vj 6= ;ggj2J0 is a ﬁnite subcover of K(X).





j is closed, hence compact in X. Since C is
an SK(X)–cover of K(X), there must exists i0 2 I such that
T
j2J V c
j ½ Ui0. Note that Uc
i0
is closed, hence compact in X, and that Uc
i0 ½
S
j2J Vj. Hence there exists a ﬁnite subcover
fVjgj2J0 of Uc
i0. It follows that if K 2 K(X) is such that K 6½ Ui0, then there exists j 2 J0
such that K \ Vj 6= ;. Hence C0 = ffK 2 K(X) j K ½ Ui0g;fK 2 K(X) j K \ Vj 6= ;ggj2J0
is a ﬁnite subcover of K(X).
(iii) Let SK(Y ) = ffL 2 K(Y ) j L ½ V g; fL 2 K(Y ) j L \ V 6= ;g; V open in Y g
and SK(X) as in (ii). It is immediate to check that (fK)¡1(SK(Y )) ½ SK(X) provided f is
continuous. Since SK(X) and SK(Y ) are respectively subbases of the Hausdorﬀ topology on
K(X) and K(Y ), the result follows.
21(iv) Simply remark that for any A 2 K(X), gK(fK(A)) = gK(ff(x) j x 2 Ag) =
fg(f(x)) j x 2 Ag. The result follows immediately. ¤
Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 3. Let f·ngn¸1 2 D, and let Kn = ·n £
Q
º¸n Zº ½ Z1. It is obvious
from the deﬁnition of D that fKngn¸1 is a nested sequence of sets. Let K =
T
n¸1 Kn.
For any n ¸ 0 and kn 2 ·n, there exists kn+1 2 ·n+1 such that ProjZn¡1(kn+1) = kn. In
particular (ProjZ0(k1);:::;ProjZn(kn+1); :::) 2 K 6= ;. Tychonoﬀ theorem implies that the
sets Z1 and fKngn¸1 are compact in the product topology, hence K is compact as well. By
construction, ProjZn¡1(K) = ·n for all n ¸ 1. It follows that f : D ! K(Z1) : f·ngn¸1 7! K
is one-to-one and onto. By Lemma 2(i), K(Zn¡1) is Hausdorﬀ for each n ¸ 1; hence D is
Hausdorﬀ in the relative product topology. By Lemma 2(ii), K(Z1) is compact. Since f¡1
is a bijection from a compact space into a Hausdorﬀ space, it is a homeomorphism if and
only if it is continuous. It is thus suﬃcient to prove that for each n ¸ 1, the mapping
Proj
K
Zn : K(Z1) ! K(Zn¡1) : K 7! ProjZn(K), is continuous. This follows from Lemma
2(iii) and the deﬁnition of the product topology on Z1. ¤
Proof of Proposition 1. Set Z0 = X0, and Zn = K(Xn¡1) for each n ¸ 1. Thus Zn = Xn
and Z1 = S £ T0. By Lemma 2(i)-(ii), the sets fZngn¸1 are compact Hausdorﬀ provided S
is. The set of coherent types is exactly D. The result follows then from Lemma 3. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. Using the fact that f is a homeomorphism, it is immediate to
check by induction that the sets fTkgk¸2 are non-empty and nested. We now prove that for
each k ¸ 1, Tk 2 K(T1). For k = 1, this follows from Proposition 1. Suppose next that
Tk¡1 2 K(T1), for some k ¸ 2. By compactness of S and Tk¡1, K(S £ Tk¡1) is a compact
topological subspace of K(S £ T1). Since t 2 Tk if and only if f(t) is a compact subset of
S £Tk¡1 in the relative topology induced by S £T1, it follows that Tk = f¡1(K(S £Tk¡1)),
and hence that Tk is compact since f is a homeomorphism. Since the sets fTkgk¸1 are nested,
T1 6= ;. One has T1 = ft 2 T1 j f(t) ½ S£T1g, so f(T1) = fK 2 K(S£T0) j K ½ S£T1g
since f is onto. But f(T1) is homeomorphic to T1 and fK 2 K(S £ T0) j K ½ S £ T1g is
homeomorphic to K(S £ T1), hence the result. ¤
22Proof of Lemma 4. If the mapping R0 = R is continuous, then so is the mapping
(IdS;R0) : ˆ X0 ! S £K( ˆ X0). Therefore R1 = (IdS;R0)K is continuous by Lemma 2(iii). The
claim follows by iterated applications of this argument. ¤
Proof of Lemma 5. We have to prove that, for any n ¸ 0, Pn+1 ± Qn+1 ± Rn+1 = Qn. We
proceed by induction. First, note that by construction, Q1 ±R1 = (IdS;ProjS)K ±(IdS;R0)K,
which in turn is equal to (IdS;ProjS ± R0)K by Lemma 2(iv). Since P1 = Proj
K
S and the
ﬁrst component of Q1 ± R1 is IdS, P1 ± Q1 ± R1 = Proj
K
S = Q0 by construction. This proves
the claim for n = 0. Suppose now that the claim holds for some n ¸ 0. By construction,
Pn+2±Qn+2±Rn+2 = (IdS;Pn+1)K±(IdS;Qn+1)K±(IdS;Rn+1)K, which is equal to (IdS;Pn+1±
Qn+1 ± Rn+1)K by Lemma 2(iv), and therefore to (IdS;Pn)K = Pn+1 by the induction step
and the deﬁnition of Pn+1. This completes the proof. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Let ˆ · : T !
Q
n¸0 K( ˆ Xn) : t 7! fRn¡1 ± ::: ± R0(t)gn¸1
and ·¤ :
Q
n¸0 K( ˆ Xn) ! T ¤
0 : fˆ ·ngn¸1 7! fQn¡1(ˆ ·n)gn¸0. By Lemma 4, Rn¡1 ± ::: ± R0 is
continuous for any n ¸ 1. By deﬁnition of the product topology on
Q
n¸1 K( ˆ Xn), this implies
that ˆ · is continuous. Next, Qn is continuous for each n ¸ 0. Since ·¤ maps
Q
n¸0 K( ˆ Xn)
component by component into T ¤
0, ·¤ is continuous, as well as 'T;R = ·¤ ± ˆ ·. Finally, it is
immediate from Lemma 5 that 'T;R(t) is a coherent ¤–hierarchy for any t 2 T, and therefore
that ' maps T into T ¤
1.
(ii) Note ﬁrst that if T is a compact space and (T;R) is a complete possibility structure,
then the mappings fRngn¸0 are onto. Indeed, if (T;R) is complete, R0 = R is onto by
deﬁnition. If R0 is continuous, the inverse image by R0 of any compact ˆ ·1 2 K( ˆ X0) is closed
in T, hence compact if T is compact. (Note that since ˆ X0 is Hausdorﬀ, any compact subset
of ˆ X0 is closed.) The claim follows by iterated applications of this argument. Next, we
show that if T is compact and (T;R) is complete, then 'T;R : T ! T ¤
1 is onto. Indeed,
ﬁx f·¤
ngn¸1 2 T ¤








ˆ ·n¡1 2 R
¡1
n¡1(ˆ ·n). If n = 1, ˆ ·n¡1 2 T. If n ¸ 2, it follows from the previous claim and the
coherency of f·¤
ngn¸1 that Qn¡2(ˆ ·n¡1) = Pn¡1(·¤
n) = ·¤









n¡1). Repeated applications of this argument using the mappings
Rn¡1;:::;R0 allow us no construct a sequence (t;ˆ k1;:::kn) 2 T £
Q
0·m·n¡1 K( ˆ Xm) such
that ˆ k1 = R0(t), Rm(ˆ ·m) = ˆ ·m+1 and Qm¡1(ˆ ·m) = ·¤
m for each m 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1g. For
23any n ¸ 1, let Tn = ft 2 T j ·¤
n = Qn¡1 ± Rn¡1 ± ::: ± R0(t)g. By the previous claim,









n¡1) for each n ¸ 2, it is easy to check that Tn+1 ½ Tn for
any n ¸ 1. Therefore
T
n¸1 Tn 6= ;. To complete the proof, remark that by construction
'T;R(t) = f·¤
ngn¸1 for any t 2
T
n¸1 Tn. Hence 'T;R is onto, as claimed. Now, suppose
that (T;R) = (T1;g). From (i) and the above argument, the mapping 'T1;g is continuous
and onto. Since T1 is compact and T ¤
1 is Hausdorﬀ, it is suﬃcient to prove that 'T1;g is
one-to-one. For any n ¸ 1, let Kn = f·n 2 K(Xn¡1) j 9t 2 T1 s:t: ·n = ProjK(Xn¡1)(t)g
and Kn = ff·mg1·m·n 2
Q
1·m·n Km j 9t 2 T1 s:t: ·m = ProjK(Xm¡1)(t); m 2 f1;:::;ngg.
We shall now show that, for any n ¸ 1, there exists a one-to-one and continuous mapping
fn : Kn ! K(X¤
n¡1) such that, for any t 2 T1, Qn¡1±Rn¡1±:::±R0(t) = fn(ProjK(Xn¡1)(t)).
Note ﬁrst that, for any t 2 T1, Q0 ± R0(t) = Proj
K
X0(g(t)) = ProjK(X0)(t) by canonicity of g.
Hence f1 = IdK(S) = IdK1, which proves the claim for n = 1. Next, suppose that the claim
holds for n ¸ 1. Consider the mapping ¿n : Kn ! Kn : (·1;:::;·n) 7! ·n, i.e., the restriction
to Kn of ProjK(Xn¡1) :
Q
1·m·n K(Xm¡1) ! K(Xn¡1). Since any type in T1 is coherent, ¿n
is a continuous bijection, hence a homeomorphism from Kn to Kn. Then, for each t 2 T1,
Qn ± Rn ± ::: ± R0(t) = (IdS;Qn¡1)K ± (IdS;Rn¡1)K ± ::: ± (IdS;g)K ± g(t)
= (IdS;Qn¡1 ± Rn¡1 ± ::: ± g)K ± g(t)
=
©




(˜ s;fn ± ¿n(ProjK(X0)(˜ t);:::;ProjK(Xn¡1)(˜ t)) j (˜ s;˜ t) 2 g(t)
ª
= (IdS;fn ± ¿n)K¡©
(˜ s;ProjK(X0)(˜ t);:::;ProjK(Xn¡1)(˜ t)) j (˜ s;˜ t) 2 g(t)
ª¢
= (IdS;fn ± ¿n)K¡
ProjXn(g(t))
¢




where the second equality follows from Lemma 2(iv), the third from the induction hypothesis,
the fourth from the deﬁnition of ¿n together with the coherency of ˜ t, and the seventh from
the canonicity of g. Since fn is continuous and one-to-one, and ¿n is a homeomorphism, it
follows that fn+1 ´ (IdS;fn ± ¿n)K : Kn+1 ! K(X¤
n) is continuous and one-to-one. Consider
two types t 6= ˜ t 2 T1, and let n(t;˜ t) = inffn ¸ 1 j ProjK(Xn¡1)(t) 6= ProjK(Xn¡1)(˜ t)g < 1.
From the above argument, it follows that for any n ¸ 1, t and ˜ t have diﬀerent images under
24Qn¡1 ± Rn¡1 ± ::: ± R0 if and only if n ¸ n(t;˜ t). Thus 'T1;g is one-to-one, as claimed. ¤
Proof of Lemma 6. For any fyngn¸0 2 Y1, deﬁne inductively H1 =
Q
n¸1 yn and, for
any n ¸ 1, Hn+1 = fÀ 2 Hn j Àn¡1 = pn¡1(Àn)g. Along the same lines as in the proof of
Lemma 3, it is easy to check that H =
T
n¸1 Hn is a non-empty compact subset of Y1 and
that the mapping p : Y1 ! K(Y1) : fyngn¸0 7! H is one-to-one and continuous. Now,
let · 2 K(Y1). For each n ¸ 0, ProjYn(·) is a compact subset of Yn, hence an element of
Yn+1. Deﬁne a sequence fyn(·)gn¸0 2
Q
n¸0 Yn by y0(·) = inffy0 j y0 2 ProjY0(·)g, and
yn(·) = ProjYn¡1(·) for each n ¸ 1. Note ﬁrst that p0(y1(·)) = y0(·) by construction. Next,
for any n ¸ 1, pn(yn+1(·)) = fpn¡1(yn) j yn 2 ProjYn(·)g = ProjYn¡1(·) = yn(·) since
any sequence in · belongs to Y1. Hence fyn(·)gn¸0 2 Y1. Since p(fyn(·)gn¸0) = · by
construction, this implies that p is onto, which completes the proof. ¤
Proof of Lemma 7. Note ﬁrst that » = IdB trivially satisﬁes Deﬁnition 6, so K(S;B) is non-
empty. The set of » 2 K(S)B that satisfy Deﬁnition 6(i) is homeomorphic to
Q
B2B K(B),
hence compact. Now ﬁx A;B 2 B, A ½ B, and let ΞA;B be the set of » 2 K(S)B that
satisfy Deﬁnition 6(ii) for the pair A;B, that is, ΞA;B = f» 2 K(S)B j »(B) \ A = ;g [ f» 2
K(S)B j »(B)\A 6= ; and »(B)\A = »(A)g. The ﬁrst set in this union is homeomorphic to
K(S)BnfBg £K(Ac) and is therefore compact as A is open. The second set is homeomorphic
to K(S)BnfA;Bg £ f(K \ A;K) j K 2 K(S); K \ A 6= ;g. Note that, as A is closed, fK 2
K(S) j K \ A 6= ;g is compact. Moreover, f(K \ A;K) j K 2 K(S); K \ A 6= ;g is
homeomorphic to Graph(Á), where Á : fK 2 K(S) j K \ A 6= ;g ! K(S) : K 7! K \ A.
Using the fact that A is clopen, it is easy to check that Á is continuous. Hence, since K(S)
is Hausdorﬀ, Graph(Á) is closed, and therefore compact as a subset of the compact space
fK 2 K(S) j K \ A 6= ;g £ K(S). Thus ΞA;B is compact, as the union of two compact sets.




A;B2B;A½B ΞA;B and hence is compact. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4. For any B 2 B, f»ngn¸1 7! f»n(Cn¡1(B))gn¸1 is a continuous
map from T1(B) into D ´ ff·ngn¸1 j ·n 2 K(Xn¡1) and ProjXn¡1(·n+1) = ·n; n ¸ 1g.




0·m·n¡1 Zm for any n ¸ 1. Since the spaces fZngn¸0 are compact Hausdorﬀ, it follows
from Lemma 3 that there exists a homeomorphism f : D ! K(S £ T0(B)) such that, for all
f·ngn¸1 2 D and m ¸ 1, ProjXm¡1(f(f·ngn¸1)) = ·m. Thus for any B 2 B, the mapping
fB : T1(B) ! K(S£T0(B)) : f»ngn¸1 7! f(f»n(Cn¡1(B))gn¸1) is well deﬁned and continuous,
25and ProjXm¡1(fB(f»ngn¸1)) = »m(Cm¡1(B)) for each f»ngn¸1 2 T1(B). This implies that the
mapping f(B) = (fB)B2B : T1(B) ! K(S £T0(B))B is continuous and one-to-one, and satis-
ﬁes the condition required by the result. Hence, since T1(B) is compact and K(S £ T0(B))B
is a Hausdorﬀ space, we only have to prove that f(B)(T1(B)) = K(S £ T0(B);B). To prove
that f(T1(B)) ½ K(S £ T0(B);B), note ﬁrst that for any B 2 B and f»ngn¸1 2 T1(B),
ProjX0(fB(f»ngn¸1)) = »1(B) ½ B since »1 is a compact conditional belief system over
(S;B). It follows that f(B)(f»ngn¸1)(C1(B)) ½ C1(B) = B £ T0(B) and thus Deﬁnition
6(i) is satisﬁed. Next, let A;B 2 B such that A ½ B and f(B)(f»ngn¸1)(C1(B))\C1(A) 6=
;. Then, for each m ¸ 0, ProjXm(f(B)(f»ngn¸1)(C1(B))) \ ProjXm(C1(A)) 6= ;. By
projection, we get that »m+1(Cm(B)) \ Cm(A) 6= ;, and since Deﬁnition 6(ii) applies to
»m+1, »m+1(Cm(A)) = »m+1(Cm(B)) \ Cm(A). Since this is true for each m, it follows that
f(B)(f»ngn¸1)(C1(A)) = f(B)(f»ngn¸1)(C1(B)) \ C1(A) and thus Deﬁnition 6(ii) is satis-
ﬁed. It remains to prove that K(S £T0(B);B) ½ f(B)(T1(B)). Let » 2 K(S £T0(B);B), and
for any B 2 B and n ¸ 1, deﬁne »n(Cn¡1(B)) = ProjXn¡1(»(C1(B))) 2 K(Xn¡1). It is suﬃ-
cient to prove that f»ngn¸1 2 T1(B). First, it is clear that, by construction, »n(Cn¡1(B)) =
ProjXn¡1(»n+1(Cn(B))) for any n ¸ 1. Hence, we need only to prove that for each n ¸ 1,
»n 2 K(Xn¡1;B). First, since » 2 K(S £ T0(B);B), one must have »(C1(B)) ½ C1(B)
for any B 2 B, hence »n(Cn¡1(B)) ½ Cn¡1(B) by projection on Xn¡1. Thus Deﬁnition 6(i)
holds. Now suppose that for some A;B 2 B, A ½ B, we have »n(Cn¡1(B)) \ Cn¡1(A) 6= ;.
Then by projection on X0 = S, we have that »1(C0(B)) \ A 6= ; which implies that
»(C1(B)) \ C1(A) 6= ;. Hence, by Deﬁnition 6(ii), »(C1(A)) = »(C1(B)) \ C1(A). It
follows then by projection on Xn¡1 that »n(Cn¡1(A)) = »n(Cn¡1(B)) \ Cn¡1(A), and thus
Deﬁnition 6(ii) is satisﬁed. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5. First, if t 2 T1(B) and for each B 2 B, f(B)(t)(B) ½ B £
T1(B), then f(B)(t)(B) ½ B £ Tk(B) for each k ¸ 1 and therefore t 2
T
k¸1 Tk(B) =
T1(B). Reciprocally, if t 2 T1(B), then for each B 2 B and k ¸ 1, f(B)(t)(B) ½
B £ Tk(B) and therefore f(B)(t)(B) ½ B £
T
k¸1 Tk(B) = B £ T1(B). Thus T1(B) =
ft 2 T1(B) j f(B)(t)(B) ½ B £ T1(B); B 2 Bg. It follows therefore that f(B)(T1(B)) =
f» 2 K(S £ T0(B);B) j »(B £ T0(B)) ½ B £ T1(B); B 2 Bg = K(S £ T1(B);B), which im-
plies the result. ¤
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